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On  the  Speed  of  Transition 
in  Central  Europe 
1. Introduction 
Transition  in  Central  Europe  is  four  years  old.  State  firms that  domi- 
nated  the  economy  are struggling  with  market  forces.  A new  private 
sector quickly emerged  and has taken hold.  Unemployment,  which  did 
not exist, is high  and still increasing. 
These  changes  are raising many  fears and  many  questions,  to which 
economists  have  not  yet  given  answers.  Will this  process  of  transition 
accelerate  or  slow  down?  Will  unemployment  keep  increasing?  Can 
things  go wrong  and how? 
Our purpose  in this paper is to develop  a framework  to think about 
those  questions,  and  to-gingerly-use  it  to  have  a  first pass  at  the 
answers.  The basic structure of the model  we  develop  is standard, that 
of the  transition  from a low-  to a high-productivity  sector. But we  pay 
attention  to two  aspects  that strike us as especially  important. The first 
is  the  interaction  between  unemployment  and  the  decisions  of  both 
state  and  private  firms. The  second  are  the  idiosyncracies  that  come 
from the  central planning  legacy,  from the  structure of control  within 
state firms, to the lack of many market institutions,  which  limits private 
sector growth. 
Our paper starts with  a description  of transition in Poland  so far. We 
choose  Poland because  we  know  it best; but, because  it started first, this 
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is  also  the  country  where  one  has  the  most  evidence  to  look  at. Our 
purpose  is to point  to those  aspects  of transition  that seem  to us to be 
central to modeling  later. We then  develop  a model  and use  it to think 
about  the  determinants  of  the  speed  of  transition  and  the  level  of 
unemployment.  Having  done  so,  we  return,  in  a  more  speculative 
mode,  to  the  role  of  policy  and  the  future  in  Poland,  as  well  as  the 
causes  of cross-Central European  country  variations. 
2. The  Transition  in Poland  So Far 
Our purpose  here  is not to give  a detailed  historical account  of events, 
but  a few  guideposts  are nevertheless  needed.1  Two  dates  are impor- 
tant.  The  first  is  January  1990,  when  economic  transition  started  in 
earnest, with  price liberalization and stabilization; the second  is January 
1991, which  saw  the  collapse  of  trade  between  Central  and  Eastern 
European  countries.  The evolution  of the basic aggregates  since  1990 is 
given  in  Table  1. The  first two  years  were  associated  with  large  de- 
creases  in  gross  domestic  product  (GDP) and  even  larger decreases  in 
industrial  production2.  Output  stabilized  in mid-1992, and  preliminary 
estimates  of GDP growth  in 1993 are around 4%. Employment  declined 
initially more slowly  than  GDP but has kept  declining  despite  the  turn 
in output.  As a result, unemployment  has steadily risen and now  stands 
around  16%. It is still increasing,  but at the  small rate of about  0.1% a 
month. 
To  understand  the  process  of  transition  however,  one  must  look 
beyond  the aggregate  numbers.  To this we  now  turn. 
Table  1  BASIC  AGGREGATES:  POLAND  1989-1993 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
GDP  100  88.4  81.7  82.9  86.2 
Industrial  production  100  75.8  66.7  69.4  73.7 
Unemployment  rate  6.3%  11.8%  13.6%  15.7% 
GDP and industrial production: year averages, 1989 = 100. 1993 GDP: estimate. 1993 industrial 
production: average for the first 11 months. Unemployment rate: end of year. 
Sources:  OECD, and Polish Central Statistical  Office (GUS). 
1.  For an  early  account,  see  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990). For more  recent  ones,  see  Sachs 
(1993), Berg and Blanchard (1994), and references  therein. 
2.  There is a consensus  that, for reasons  ranging  from conceptual  to scope  of coverage, 
reported  declines  in GDP overestimate  true declines.  But the sign of the decline  and its 
large magnitude  are not in doubt. For further discussion,  see Berg.(1993). Analytics  of Transition  *  285 
2.1 THE  HARDENING  BUDGET  CONSTRAINT 
As reform started, there were  fears that state firms, which  had operated 
under  soft budget  constraints  and  were  now  exposed  to large relative 
cost  and  demand  shocks,  would  successfully  resist attempts  to  harden 
their  budget  constraint.  These  fears  proved  unjustified.  In  Poland  as 
well  as in  most  other  Central European  countries-and  in  sharp con- 
trast  to  Russia-the  budget  constraint  facing  state  firms has  steadily 
hardened. 
Subsidies to state firms have  steadily  decreased,  from 4.5% of GDP in 
1989 to 1.1% of GDP in 1993. Subsidies are, however,  only the overt part 
of  a  soft  budget  constraint.  Tax  arrears, interenterprise  arrears, and 
bank loans  are the covert parts. They have  all been  used  by state firms, 
but with  limited  and decreasing  success. 
Interenterprise  arrears quickly mounted  in 1990 and  1991, leading  in 
effect  to  forced  lending  by  profit  makers  to  loss  makers.  But  firms 
became  increasingly  reluctant  to  be  forced  lenders  and  increasingly 
asked  for  payment  on  delivery.  By  the  end  of  1991,  interenterprise 
arrears were  decreasing,  and  they  are no longer  a financing  option  for 
loss-making  firms. Tax arrears, in  effect forced  lending  by  the  govern- 
ment  to loss-making  firms, also increased  initially. By the  end  of  1991, 
tax arrears from state firms were  equal  to  12% of budget  revenues,  or 
4% of  GDP,  and  increasing.  Signals  by  the  government  that  it  was 
going  to  be  tougher  on  enforcement  were  successful,  and  tax arrears 
have  declined  since.  They  stand  at only  8% of revenues  at the  end  of 
1993. 
The main source of hidden  subsidies,  however,  has been  bank loans. 
Given  that  the  banking  system  had  traditionally  been  a  conduit  for 
government  transfers to  firms, and  remained  state-owned,  many  state 
firms were initially able to get loans to cover their losses. A current bank 
cleanup  cum  privatization  program,  applied  to  the  major banks,  has 
given  us good  estimates  of the  extent  of bad loans.3 The proportion  of 
bad loans appears to be around 40% of loans to state firms, or about 8% 
of GDP. Most were  made  in the first two  years of transition. And most 
were  made  to  a  small  proportion  of  firms.4  The  current  process  of 
privatization  of banks  appears  likely  to eliminate  this  option  entirely.5 
3. The cleanup program,  and the way in which it deals with both the stock of bad loans 
and the incentives not to make new ones, is interesting  in its own right.  A description 
of the banking system and of the program  are given in DAI (1993). 
4. For further  discussion,  see Gomulka  (1993a). 
5. As part of the process of cleaning up of the banks'  balance sheets, firms that cannot 
repay their debt must be closed or restructured.  While one  can anticipate that a 
number  of firms,  which are politically  sensitive,  will be kept alive, they appear  likely to 
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2.2 THE  RETRENCHMENT  OF STATE  FIRMS 
The  sources  of  the  output  decline  during  the  first  two  years  were 
macroeconomic  stabilization,  price  liberalization,  and  the  collapse  of 
trade  within  the  Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (CMEA). 
Their relative roles, as well  as the specific channels  through  which  these 
shocks affected output,  are still the subject of research and controversy.6 
Identifying  specific  sources  is, however,  not  essential  to  our purposes. 
What  is important  is how  state  firms have  adjusted  to  this  decline  in 
output.7 
The  adjustment  of  employment  to  output  has  been  slow.  Labor 
productivity  in industry  (a number  that reflects mostly  the behavior  of 
state firms) stood  in  December  1991 at only  77% of its December  1989 
level.  Increases  in  production  and  further  decreases  in  employment 
since  have  led  to  an  increase  in  productivity,  but  it  still  stood,  in 
December  1993, at only  85% of its pre-reform level.  Much  of the  initial 
adjustment  was  accomplished  through  attrition:  70% of  the  employ- 
ment  decline  in  1990 was  accounted  for by  early retirements.  As time 
has  passed,  however,  layoffs  have  become  increasingly  important,  and 
they  now  account  for more than half of separations  in state firms.8 
Profits have  disappeared.  The  ratio  of  gross  profits  to  sales  in  state 
firms, which  was  equal to 28% in 1989, declined  to 23% in 1990, 7% in 
1991, 3% in 1992, and 4% for the first 11 months  of 1993.9 This decrease 
in  profits  reflects  mostly  a  trimming  of  the  positive  tail  of  the  profit 
distribution. The share of income  going  to firms showing  a gross loss in 
total  income  has  remained  roughly  constant,  equal  to  19.3% in  1991, 
20.4% in  1992,  and  20.0% in  1993. Two  sectors  are  showing  a  much 
larger share, mining  (65%) and transport equipment  (55%). Not  surpris- 
ingly, these  are also the two  sectors that account for a large share of bad 
loans. 
There  is  little  evidence  of  restructuring  beyond  the  labor shedding 
needed  to avoid  losses.  The need  for major reorganization  of firms, for 
more  modern  capital  equipment,  has  been  widely  documented.10  Yet 
6.  See, e.g., Berg and Blanchard (1994) versus  Calvo and Coricelli (1993). 
7.  What follows  is based in part on Blanchard et al. (1993). Recent studies  of the behavior 
of  state  firms include  Estrin et  al. (1993)  and  Pinto  et  al. (1993).  See  also  Fan  and 
Schaffer (1993). A survey  of case studies  from Poland  and other  countries  is given  in 
Carlin et al. (1994). 
8.  The survey  by Pinto  et al. (1993) gives  assessments  by managers  of "excess  employ- 
ment" in their firms as of mid-1992. The mean  is 12%. 
9.  The  surprisingly  large  profit  rates  in  1990-in  view  of  the  output  decline-reflect 
mostly  accounting  profits,  FIFO inventory  valuation  combined  with  high  inflation. 
See Schaffer (1992). 
10.  See  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990).  The  many  sectoral  studies  since  have  confirmed  this 
view. Analytics  of Transition  ?  287 
little is happening.  The evidence  must by nature be more impressionis- 
tic  here,  because  the  distinction  between  closing  and  restructuring  is 
often  less clear-cut than we  make it sound.  But the  aggregate  evidence 
on  investment  supports  the  evidence  from case  studies.  Restructuring 
should  be  associated  with  high  levels  of  investment.  Investment  in 
industry  has  decreased  instead,  although  by  less  than  industrial  pro- 
duction.  It stood  in  1991 at 86.0% of  its 1989 value  and  has  remained 
roughly  constant  since. The ratio of investment  to sales in state firms in 
industry  was  equal  to  5.4%  for  the  first  11  months  of  1993;  this 
compares,  e.g., to a ratio of 7% for U.S. manufacturing  firms. 
These  evolutions  are explained  by  the  fact that  state  firms are con- 
trolled by workers  with  uncertain  stakes and  horizons:  While the  state 
has  remained  the  de  jure  owner  of  state  firms, it has  had  neither  the 
means  nor the  inclination  to exercise  its control rights. Instead,  control 
has  reverted  to  the  workers.  In Poland,  a latent  structure of  workers' 
control, the "workers  councils," had been  put in place in 1981. As long 
as managers  had  the backing  of the center, these  councils  did not play 
an important  role. But, in the vacuum  created by reform, these  councils 
assumed  more power,  including  the ability to hire and fire managers. At 
this point,  workers' councils  have  an effective  veto  power  in any major 
decision  concerning  a  firm.1  This,  together  with  limited  access  to 
outside  finance,  explains  why  adjustment  of  employment  has  been 
slow,  why  profits  have  been  appropriated  by  workers  in  the  form  of 
wages,  and why  restructuring and investment  have  remained  low. 
2.3 THE  SLOW  PROGRESS  OF PRIVATIZATION 
The  incentives  and  the  constraints  faced  by  state  firms we  have  just 
described  have  not  come  as a great  surprise.  Indeed,  it was  for these 
reasons  that  rapid  privatization  was  seen  as essential  to restructuring. 
However,  this was based on the assumption  that the state, as the owner 
of  firms,  could  dispose  of  them  as  it  wanted.  This  assumption  has 
turned  out to be wrong,  and precisely  for the reasons we just analyzed: 
Like  every  other  decision  involving  state  firms, privatization  has  re- 
quired,  de  facto, workers'  approval.  This has  largely  determined  both 
the-slow-speed  as well  as the shape  of privatization. 
11. This does not, however, imply that managers,  which have specific  expertise,  and the 
control of the agenda, are powerless.  The game between managers  and workers,  and 
its implications,  is explored in Aghion et al. (1993). 288 *  AGHION  &  BLANCHARD 
There is a bewildering  array of methods  of privatization  in Poland.12 
But two  have  dominated,  in  terms of numbers,  "capital  privatization" 
and "privatization  through  liquidation." 
"Capital  privatization"  is  the  sale  of  the  firm to  outsiders  through 
sales  or  auctions.  Under  this  arrangement,  workers  get  20% of  the 
shares at a discount  but give  up control of the firm. So far, only  100 out 
of  8,000  state  firms have  been  sold  in  this  way.  These  have  typically 
been  medium-size  firms,  with  better  than  average  prospects,  where 
workers were  therefore more willing  to give  up control in exchange  for 
external  finance  and  expertise.  Twenty-three  of  these  firms  are  now 
quoted  in  the  Warsaw  Stock  Exchange.13 The  evidence  is  that  firms 
privatized  through  this channel  have  done  well,  although  deep  restruc- 
turing  has taken  place  only  in those  firms with  large foreign  participa- 
tion.14,15 
"Privatization  through  liquidation"  has been  quantitatively  the most 
important  channel,  and  it  had  been  used  by  850 firms at  the  end  of 
1993. It allows  workers  and  management  to buy  their firm, by  paying 
20% of the estimated  value  of the firm, and making lease payments-at 
attractive  terms-for  the  remainder  over  a period  of  5-10  years.  The 
firms that have taken this route have typically been small to medium-size 
firms, with  less than 200 employees.  While this is the channel  preferred 
by  workers,  the  evidence  is  however  that  it  has  typically  not  led  to 
restructuring. The reasons  are not  hard to find. Majority ownership  by 
insiders  has  made  the  firms unable  to  raise  equity  finance,  except  by 
selling  a large or majority stake. Lease payments  to the state have led to 
high  leverage,  making  it difficult for the  firms to raise debt  finance  or 
obtain further bank loans. 
Even  if  one  adds  to  those  two  channels  "asset  sales,"  sales  of  the 
assets  of  insolvent  firms, which  account  for another  1,010 firms at the 
end of 1993, only  a total of about 2,000 firms, or 25% of state firms, have 
been  privatized  so far. 
2.4 THE  GROWTH  OF THE  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
Table  2  shows  the  evolution  of  state  and  private  employment  since 
1989. While  total  employment  has  decreased,  private  sector  employ- 
12.  Frydman et al. (1993) give  a detailed  description  of methods  and results up to the end 
of 1992 for all central European  countries. 
13.  The  share  price  index  increased  by  a  factor  of  12 during  1993. This  large  increase 
appears to be in part a speculative  bubble. At the end  of 1993, the price earnings ratio 
stood  at 35 and did not  seem  to reflect fundamentals. 
14. A detailed  analysis of a number of firms privatized  through  different channels  is given 
in Dabrowski  et al. (1993). 
15. A program known  as "mass privatization"  (a misnomer  given  its current size), which 
was  approved  in  the  summer  of  1993,  may,  if  implemented  on  schedule,  lead  to 
further privatization  of about 200-400  firms over  the next few  years. Analytics  of Transition  *  289 
Table  2  PRIVATE  AND STATE  EMPLOYMENT:  1989-1993 
All  firms  Medium  /  large  firms 
Employment  1989  1992  1993  1992  1993 
Total  13.5  11.4  11.4 
Private  1.8  4.8  5.3  2.6  2.7 
State  11.7  6.6  6.1  6.4  6.1 
Numbers in  the  first three columns are for the  end  of  the  year and  cover all employment 
outside of agriculture. Numbers in the last two columns cover employment outside of agricul- 
ture in firms with more than five employees and are averages for the first six months of each 
year. 
Source:  GUS. 
ment  has  grown  rapidly;  private  sector  employment,  which  stood  at 
13% of total employment  pre-reform, stood  at 46% at the  end  of 1993. 
When agricultural employment  is included,  the share of employment  in 
the private sector actually now  exceeds  60%.16  But these  numbers come 
with  a number of caveats. 
The first is that part of the shift reflects classification rather than true 
changes.  Cooperatives,  which  at the beginning  of reform accounted  for 
1.5  million  employees,  have  been  reclassified  as  part  of  the  private 
sector. The second  is that much  of the increase  in private employment 
has taken place in individual  businesses.  This is clear from the numbers 
in  the  last  two  columns  of  Table  2,  which  give  state  and  private 
employment  in firms with  more than five employees  in 1992 and  1993, 
and yield two conclusions.  The share of private employment  in medium 
and  large  firms is only  30%. And  the  increase  from  1992 to  1993 was 
only  a small 0.1 million.  These  two  points  deserve  elaboration. 
The initial increase  of the private sector reflected  rapid small privati- 
zation, i.e., leasing  of shops  and stores by local authorities, as well as the 
increase in trade and services induced  by price liberalization. In Decem- 
ber  1989, there  were  150,000 stores  in  Poland.  Estimates  are that,  one 
year later, there were  300,000 stores, of which  only  40,000 were  owned 
by  the  state.17  At the  end  of  1993, 84% of employment  in trade was  in 
the private sector. 
Evidence  on the creation of medium-size  private firms, firms that can 
replace  or compete  with  existing  state  firms, is  less  favorable.  Private 
employment  in firms with  more than five employees  in industry  stands 
at 1.1 million,  or 34% of total employment.  (This includes  employment 
in privatized  firms as well.)  Their performance,  at least as measured  in 
16.  More detailed  numbers,  as well  as a more  optimistic  assessment  than  the  one  given 
here, are given  in Rostowski  (1993). 
17.  Frydman et al. (1993). 290 *  AGHION  &  BLANCHARD 
official statistics, is not strong. Their reported profit rate for the first nine 
months  of 1993 was roughly  equal to zero, but this may be dismissed  as 
accounting  designed  to avoid paying  profit taxes. Average  wages  in the 
private sector stood  at 90% of those  in the state sector. Investment  as a 
ratio to employment  was only  marginally higher  than for their counter- 
part state firms. Case studies  document  that, except  for firms involved 
in  joint  ventures  with  foreign  investors,  new  private  firms  typically 
finance  themselves  from accumulated  savings  and retained  earnings. 
This  points  to  the  importance  of  foreign  direct  investment.  Official 
estimates  are that cumulative  foreign  direct investment  so far has been 
only  $1.0 billion,  or about 2% of GDP. Very  small during  the  first two 
years, the flow  doubled  in 1993 compared  with  1992. 
2.5 THE  INCREASE  AND THE  NATURE  OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
As Table 2 shows,  the  increase  in  private-sector  employment  has  not 
offset the decrease in state employment,  and unemployment  has steadily 
increased.  Registered  unemployment  stands  at 3.0 million,  or 16.0% of 
the  labor force. An alternative  estimate  of  unemployment  comes  from 
the  newly  available labor force survey.  In December  1993, when  regis- 
tered  unemployment  stood  at  2.8  million,  estimated  unemployment 
from the survey  stood  at a somewhat  lower  2.3 million.18 
Gross flows,  in and  out  of employment,  are substantially  larger than 
net  flows.19 In  1992, a net  decrease  of  10% of  state  employment  was 
accounted  for by accessions  equal to 20% and separations  equal to 10% 
of  state  employment.  These  rates, while  lower  than  those  in  Western 
countries,  reflect  the  heterogeneity  of  shocks  across  state  firms. And 
turnover  was  also  substantial  in  the  private  sector.  A net  increase  of 
employment  of  0.1  million  in  existing  private  firms  in  1992  was  ac- 
counted  for by accessions  equal to 15% and separations  equal to 14% of 
private employment.  Roughly  half of all gross flows  were  directly from 
employment  to  employment  and  half  to  or  from  unemployment  or 
nonparticipation. 
Gross flows  are still small in relation to the pool  of unemployed.  As a 
result,  the  turnover  rate  in  unemployment  is  very  low.  The  monthly 
exit  rate  from  unemployment  in  1992 was  4%. The  monthly  exit  rate 
from unemployment  to employment  was 2.3%; compare this with  a rate 
of  25% in  the  United  States.  And,  despite  a  shift  from  a  policy  of 
open-ended  unemployment  benefits  to  benefits  expiring  after  a  year, 
the  proportion  of long-term  unemployment  is steadily  increasing.  The 
18.  Gora (1994) guesses  that this difference reflects the fact that registering  for unemploy- 
ment  entitles  one  to health  care benefits,  leading  people  classified as out of the labor 
force in the  survey  to register at the unemployment  office. 
19. The numbers  that follow  are constructed  in Blanchard et al. (1993). Analytics of Transition ?  291 
proportion  of  workers  unemployed  for  more  than  one  year  stood  in 
mid-1993 at 39% of total unemployment,  and the proportion  of workers 
unemployed  for more than two  years stood  at 14%. 
The  distribution  of  unemployment  across age,  sex, and  education  is 
roughly  similar to that of Western European countries with  similar rates 
of  unemployment.  The  rate  of  unemployment  is  higher  among  the 
young  and  the  unskilled.  However,  the  geographical  distribution  of 
unemployment  is very  uneven.  Unemployment  is much  lower  in large 
cities.  The  unemployment  rate in  Warsaw  was  equal  to  7.7% in  1993, 
roughly  half the national  average. 
2.6 THE  FISCAL  AND POLITICAL  IMPLICATIONS 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
High  unemployment  in turn is shaping  the process  of transition. It has 
made  fiscal  balance  much  more  difficult  to  achieve.  And  it  has  also 
eroded  the  support  for reform. 
(1) The transition has led to dramatic movements  in both government 
revenues  and  spending.  Table 3 gives  the basic numbers.20 We choose 
1988 as  a  reference  year,  because  1988 is  more  representative  of  the 
structure of revenues  and  spending  prereform than 1989. 
Some  of the changes  in spending  and revenues  are due  to transition 
per se, rather than to high unemployment.  For example, on the revenue 
side, the appropriation  of rents by workers in state firms, which  has led 
to  the  disappearance  of  profits  in  state  firms,  has  led  in  turn  to  a 
decrease  in profit taxes of 8% of GDP, more than offsetting  the  decline 
in subsidies. The emergence  of the private sector has been no substitute, 
because  private firms have  typically reported  little or no profit so far. It 
took two  years to put in place a personal  income  tax, which  now  yields 
Table  3  THE  BUDGET:  1988-1993 
(% of GDP)  1988  1992  1993 
Revenues  35.6  27.2  29.1 
Indirect  tax  10.8  9.0  11.0 
Profit  tax  12.1  4.5  4.0 
Expenditures  37.0  33.3  32.5 
Subsidies  to firms  6.0  1.4  1.1 
Capital  expenditures  4.2  1.6 
Source:  1988 and 1992: Quarterly  Economic  Review, EBRD,  April 1993. 1993: Budget forecasts as 
presented in the 1994 draft budget. 
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6% of GDP. It took three years to put in place a value-added  tax, which 
replaced  the turnover  tax in 1993. 
But, in  addition,  lower  activity  and  high  unemployment  have  made 
budget  balance  much  more  difficult. Despite  the  tightening  of  unem- 
ployment  benefits,  expenditures  on  labor market  policies-which  are 
partly off budget-have  steadily  increased. They stood  in 1992 at 2% of 
GDP.21 Early retirements  have  contributed  to the very large increase in 
pensions.22 
These  changes  have  forced the government  to rely on a combination 
of new  taxes, cuts in capital expenditures,  and budget  deficits. Despite  a 
clear need  for more  infrastructure, capital expenditures  have  been  cut 
and  stood  at  only  1.6% of  GDP  in  1993.  The  budget  deficit,  which 
peaked  at 6% of  GDP in  1992, is forecast  to  stand  at 4.1% of GDP  in 
1994. 
(2)  High  unemployment  largely  explains  the  results  of  the  1993 
elections,  which  saw the defeat  of the coalition that had introduced  and 
implemented  reform since  1989. The elections  were  won  by a coalition 
of  two  conservative  (in  the  Eastern  European  sense)  parties,  parties 
with  ties  to  previous  communist  organizations.  So far, the  policy  that 
has  been  followed  has  not  differed  fundamentally  from  the  policies 
pursued  earlier.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  higher  unemployment 
increases  the  political  pressure  to  soften  the  budget  constraint  facing 
state firms, and  that this will remain the case in the future. 
3. Toward  a Formalization 
We see  three major elements  in the story we  have just presented. 
First, relative  cost  and  demand  changes,  together  with  a hardened 
budget  constraint,  have  forced  state  firms to  substantially  reduce  em- 
ployment.  But  the  deeper  process  of  reorganization,  of  upgrading  of 
capital,  the  process  of  restructuring  for  short,  has  been  slow,  both 
because  of internal incentives  and external constraints. 
Second, the  same  relative  cost  and  demand  changes  have  led  to  a 
rapid initial increase in private employment,  mostly  in small-scale trade 
and services. But further growth  of the private sector is constrained  by 
factors  ranging  from  lack  of  expertise  to  limited  access  to  external 
finance. 
21. See Boeri  et al. (1993). 
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Third, the net  effect of these  changes  in employment  so far has been 
an increase  in unemployment,  which  affects in turn both  the  speed  of 
restructuring  and the rate of private sector growth. 
This leads  us to develop  the following  model. 
The  economy  is  composed  of  two  sectors,  the  state  sector  with 
employment  E and  the  private  sector with  employment  N.  The labor 
force is normalized  to one,  so that  E +  N  +  U =  1, where  U  is unem- 
ployment,  equivalently  the  unemployment  rate. Before  the  transition, 
all workers work in the  state sector, so that  E =  1 and  N =  U =  0. 
3.1 THE  STATE  SECTOR 
(1)  We  capture  the  initial  effects  of  changes  in  the  demand  and  cost 
structure by  assuming  that, at the  start of  transition,  (1 -  E0) workers 
become  unproductive,  and  state employment  drops  to  E0. We assume 
the  remaining  workers  to  have  constant  average  product,  x. The  low 
productivity  of state firms is captured by assuming  that x is less than  y, 
the average  product  of workers in the private sector, described later. 
(2) We capture  restructuring by  assuming  that state firms can either 
operate  at x  indefinitely,  or restructure/privatize,  a decision  that leads 
to  an  initial  decrease  in  employment,  and  an  increase  in  the  average 
product  of the remaining  workers. 
Think of each firm as employing  initially one worker with  product  x. 
We assume  that, if the firm restructures, it reduces  employment  to only 
X  workers,  k <  1, with  each remaining worker producing  y, y >  x units 
of  output.  Thus,  after  restructuring,  the  firm  produces  ky  units  of 
output,  which  can be greater or less than  x. 
Let s be the  speed  of restructuring of state firms, so that 
dE/dt  =  -s.  (1) 
We start by taking  s as a variable under  the control of the government. 
This allows  us to focus on the dynamics  of the economy  given  s. As we 
have  argued,  however,  this  speed  is in  fact largely  endogenous,  with 
the  decisions  left  to  state  firms themselves.  Thus,  later on,  we  look  at 
the decision  process within  state firms, and endogenize  s. 
(3) We  see  these  assumptions  as capturing  the  initial  adjustment  of 
employment  and  the  trade-offs  faced  by  workers  in  restructuring.  But 
some  of the formalization  choices  deserve  comments. 
The assumption  that the average  product  takes only  two  values,  0 or 
x,  makes  the  model  unfit  to  discuss  the  role  of  subsidies  or tariffs in 
preventing  the initial  decline,  from 1 to  Eo.23 The assumption  that the 
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average  product  is  the  same  in  all firms eliminates  the  heterogeneity 
present  in  the  data  and  leads  to  what  are  too  sharp  differences  in 
regimes  later on.  The  assumption  of  instantaneous  elimination  of  un- 
productive  jobs is at clear variance with  the facts and makes the model 
ill suited  to describe  the  early dynamics  of transition; but we  believe  it 
is  not  misleading  if  our  goal  is  to  think  about  those  dynamics  in  the 
future. 
We think  that the  assumption  that state firms can, after the  elimina- 
tion of (1 -  Eo) workers, remain in a holding  pattern, is reasonable. But 
it is not innocuous.  It implies  that while  delays  in restructuring have  an 
opportunity  cost,  firms can  survive  without  it,  and  the  economy  can 
operate  at  a  low  level  of  productivity.  If  for  example,  we  assumed 
instead  that,  absent  restructuring,  state  employment  steadily  declined, 
the dynamics  and some  of the conclusions  of our model  would  be very 
different. We shall return to this issue  later. 
Finally, we  make no distinction  between  privatization  and restructur- 
ing.  But the  evidence  we  gave  earlier shows  that the  relation between 
restructuring and privatization  is much  less tight than we  assume  here. 
Privatization  does  not  necessarily  imply  restructuring.  But, restructur- 
ing, to the extent  that it requires outside  finance, requires privatization; 
this is what  we  want  to capture here. 
3.2 THE  NEW PRIVATE  SECTOR 
(1) We  capture  the  initial  effects  of  changes  in  the  cost  and  demand 
structure on  trade and  services  by  assuming  that at the  start of  transi- 
tion, there is a discrete increase in private employment  from 0 to  No. 
Thereafter,  private  job  creation  (i.e.,  the  increase  in  private-sector 
employment  not  due  to  privatization/restructuring  of  state  firms)  is 
given  by 
H=  a(y  -  z -  w),  (2) 
where  H  is  private  job  creation,  a  is  a  parameter,  y  is  the  constant 
average  product  of  labor in  the  private  sector,  w  is  the  wage  in  the 
private  sector,  and  z  are taxes  per  worker.  Thus,  private  job creation 
depends  on  profit  per  worker,  the  difference  between  the  average 
product  of labor, y, and direct and indirect labor costs, (w  +  z). 
(2) Private sector wages  depend  on  labor market conditions,  accord- 
ing to 
w =  b +  c(r  +  H/U),  (3) Analytics  of Transition  ?  295 
where  b is unemployment  benefits,  r  is the  interest  rate,  H/U  is the 
ratio of hires to unemployment,  and  c is a constant. 
Equation  (3) captures  two  basic notions.  The  first is simply  that  the 
private  wage  depends  on  labor market  conditions.  The  second  is that 
the  correct  indicator  of  labor  market  conditions  is  not  the  level  of 
unemployment  per se but rather the  exit rate out of unemployment. 
The  equation  is  easily  derived  from  efficiency  wage  considerations, 
and it is useful  for later to derive  it explicitly. 
Assume  that  all  hires  are  from  unemployment,  and  there  is  no 
turnover  in either the private or the  state sector. This implies  that total 
hires  in  the  economy  are equal  to  H,  so  that  H/U  is indeed  the  exit 
rate from unemployment. 
Let Vu and VN be the values  of being  unemployed  and employed  in 
the private sector, respectively.  These two values thus follow "arbitrage" 
equations: 
rVu =  b +  (H/U)(VN  -  Vu)  +  dVu/dt  (4) 
rVN =  w +  dVN/dt.  (5) 
When  unemployed,  a worker  receives  unemployment  benefits  b  and 
has probability H/U  of becoming  employed.  When employed,  a worker 
faces, by assumption,  no risk of becoming  unemployed  again and, thus, 
receives  the private-sector  wage  forever after. 
Efficiency wage  considerations  can be  summarized  by  the  condition 
that firms choose  a wage  such that the value  of being  employed  exceeds 
the  value  of  being  unemployed  by  some  amount,  thus,  such  that 
VN -  Vu = c, c >  O. Under  that  assumption,  which  obviously  implies 
that  dVN/dt -  dVu/dt  =  0, taking  the  difference  between  the  two  ear- 
lier equations  gives  Equation (3) above. 
(3) Let us again briefly discuss  some  of our choices  of formalization. 
We see  the  assumption  of an initial stock adjustment,  from 0 to  N0, 
followed  by a slower  process of job creation, as capturing the change  in 
the nature of the increase in private employment  over time. Small-scale 
trade  and  services,  which  dominated  at the  beginning,  required  little 
capital and  expertise.  However,  these  factors are essential  to sustained 
private-sector  growth. 
Our assumption  that the change  rather than the level  of private new 
employment  is a function  of profit per worker captures, we believe,  two 
of  the  main  constraints  on  job  creation.  The  first is  limited  access  to 
external  finance,  which  implies  that  investment  in  new  capacity 
and,  thus,  job  creation,  is limited  by  earnings.  The  second  is  costs  of 296 . AGHION  &  BLANCHARD 
adjustment,  some  physical  and  conventional,  and  some  coming  from 
such  aspects  as learning  by doing,  accumulation  of information,  devel- 
opment  of reputation  in goods  and financial markets, and so on.24 If the 
relation  comes  from  costs  of  adjustment,  however,  it  is  likely  to  be 
forward  looking:  Before  creating  jobs,  firms  will  worry  about  both 
current and future  expected  profits. We take this extension  up later. 
Some  of  the  assumptions  we  make  in  the  derivation  of  the  wage 
equation  are clearly counterfactual.  There is, as we  have  shown,  some 
turnover, and many  hires are directly from state firms rather than from 
unemployment.25  But  we  do  not  think  that  these  simplifications  are 
misleading  here.  What  is important  is not  the  exact form of  the  wage 
equation  but  the  existence  of  a  relation  between  the  exit  rate  from 
unemployment  to employment,  and the wage  in the private  sector. 
Under  the  assumptions  we  have  made  so far, higher  unemployment 
leads,  through  lower  wages,  to  faster private  job  creation.  But, as we 
have  argued  earlier,  there  are  clearly  also  channels  through  which 
unemployment  affects private  job creation  adversely.  We  now  turn  to 
those. 
3.3 TAXES  AND UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFITS 
We  formalize  these  adverse  effects  of  unemployment,  through  the 
implications  of  unemployment,  and  unemployment  benefits  on  the 
level  of taxes. We assume  that taxes are levied  equally  on employment, 
state and private, to finance unemployment  benefits.  This implies: 
Ub =  (1  -  U)z.  (6) 
This relation has a straightforward  implication.  Higher  unemployment, 
given  unemployment  benefits,  leads  to  higher  taxes  per  worker;  thus, 
ceteris  paribus, higher  unemployment  decreases  private job creation.26 
24. Chadha et al. (1992) develop a model of transition  where the growth of the private 
sector  is based explicitly  on learning  by doing. Atkeson  and Kehoe [1992]  focus on the 
role of information capital. A more explicit formalization  of creation/destruction 
along the lines of Caballero  and Hammour  (1993)  would be worth exploring.  We shy 
away from it here. 
25. Estimates  in Blanchard  et al. (1993) are that, in 1992,  half of the flows into employ- 
ment were directly  from other employment. 
26. An alternative  interpretation  of the same equation is that the transfers  are private 
altruistic transfers from the employed to the unemployed, in the amount b  per 
unemployed. Our model of wage determination  implies that such transfers  will be 
reflected  in higher wages in equilibrium,  leading to exactly the total cost of labor to 
the firms  as if they were collected in the form of taxes and distributed  as unemploy- 
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This  is  the  basic  effect  we  want  to  capture.  But  the  relation  is  a 
stand-in  for many  channels,  which  we  described  earlier. Among  those 
are the  following:  (1) The decrease  in employment  has led  not  only  to 
higher  unemployment  but also to early retirements, which  also have  to 
be financed.  (2) While better infrastructure is essential  to getting  more 
foreign direct investment,  the state has been  forced to drastically reduce 
capital  expenditures.  (3)  Unemployment  has  led  private  firms,  and 
especially  foreign  investors,  to  worry  about  political  uncertainty;  the 
commitment  of future governments  to reform; and, thus, profit prospects 
in the  future. An alternative  formalization,  which  we  shall sketch later 
when  we  extend  the  model  to  allow  for job  creation  to  depend  on 
current and future expectations  of profit, is that higher  unemployment 
increases  the  probability  that reform will  "end."  The results  from this 
alternative  specification  are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  we  derive 
using  Equation (6). 
3.4 TAKING  CARE  OF CORNERS 
In  specifying  our  assumptions,  it  might  have  been  more  natural  to 
specify  the equations  for state and private employment  in terms of rates 
of  change  rather than  changes,  i.e.,  in  terms  of  (dE/dt)/E  and  H/N 
than  in  terms  of  dE/dt  and  H.  We  have  chosen  our  specification 
because  it  substantially  simplifies  the  analysis  later, leaving  only  one 
state variable, unemployment,  rather than  two,  employment-state  or 
private-and  unemployment.  But, as a result of these  assumptions,  the 
economy  can  hit  corners,  and  we  have  to  state  what  happens  when 
those  are reached.  Those  conditions  only  play  a role at the  end  of the 
transition or when  things in the economy  go very wrong, but they must 
be specified  nevertheless: 
First, state  employment  can  only  decline  if it is positive  in  the  first 
place, so that the condition  (1) only holds  for E >  0: for E =  0, dE/dt  = 
O. Second, a similar condition  must  hold  for private employment.  Here, 
it is convenient  and innocuous  to make a slightly  different assumption, 
that for (y  -  z -  w)  <  0,  N  =  0; i.e., private firms can close  if they  are 
losing  money. 
4.  Unemployment  and the Speed  of Restructuring 
In this and the next two sections, we  take the model  through  its strides. 
Once  this is done,  we  return to Poland  and Central Europe. 
Under  our assumptions,  unemployment  follows: 
dU/dt  =  s(1  -  A) -  H  (7)  Uo =  1 -  Eo -  No. 298  .  AGHION  &  BLANCHARD 
After  the  initial  increase  in  unemployment,  unemployment  dynamics 
depend  on  the  speed  of restructuring  and on  private job creation. The 
flow into unemployment,  s(1 -  K), depends  on the speed  of restructur- 
ing, and  the proportion  of workers  losing  their jobs in the process; the 
flow  out of unemployment  is equal to private job creation,  H. 
Private job creation in turn depends  on unemployment  through  two 
channels,  wages  and  taxes.  Solving  for the  wage,  using  Equations  (2), 
(3), and (6) gives 
(w  -  b)  =  [ca/(U  +  ca)] [y  +  (r/a)U  -  ((1/(1  -  U))b].  (8) 
Replacing  w  by  its value  from  Equation  (8), and  z  by  its value  from 
Equation (6) gives  private job creation as a function  of unemployment: 
H = a[U/(U  +  ca)] [y  -  rc -  (1/(1  -  U))b]  = f(U).  (9) 
The effect of unemployment  through  wages  is captured in the first term 
in brackets: The higher  is unemployment,  the  lower  is the  wage,  and, 
thus,  the  higher  is  private  job  creation.  The  effect  of  unemployment 
through  taxes is captured  in the  second  term in brackets: The higher  is 
unemployment,  the  higher  are taxes, the  lower  is private job creation. 
Figure  1 plots  H = f(U)  as a function  of  U. When  unemployment  is 
equal  to zero,  the  wage  is equal  to the  average  product  y,  preventing 
job  creation.  As  unemployment  increases,  the  effect  that  dominates 
initially  is  the  direct  effect  on  wages,  so  that  private  job  creation 
Figure  1 DYNAMICS  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  UNDER  EXOGENOUS 
RESTRUCTURING 
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increases.  As unemployment  gets  sufficiently  large, however,  the  effect 
on  taxes  dominates  the  effect  on  wages,  and  private  job  creation 
declines.  Indeed,  as  unemployment  gets  large  enough,  wages  and 
contributions  exceed  the  average  product  of  labor,  leading  to  the 
disappearance  of the private sector altogether.  Thus, at low  unemploy- 
ment,  higher  unemployment  leads  to more job creation; at high  unem- 
ployment,  higher  unemployment  leads  to less job creation. 
If  we  draw  the  flow  into  unemployment  as  a  horizontal  line  at 
s (1 -  X) in Figure 1, we  can use the figure to characterize the dynamics 
of unemployment.  This yields  two  conclusions. 
(1)  There  is  a  maximum  speed  of  restructuring.  If  s  is  such  that 
s  (1 -  X)  exceeds  the  maximum  rate  of  private  job  creation,  then 
transition eventually  fails. Starting from low unemployment,  private job 
creation is initially  positive  and  increasing.  But it remains  smaller than 
the  flow  into  unemployment  coming  from  restructuring,  and  unem- 
ployment  becomes  so large that the adverse  fiscal effects become  domi- 
nant.  Private  job  creation  declines,  leading  to  a  faster  increase  in 
unemployment.  Eventually-at  point  C in the figure-the  fiscal burden 
becomes  so large that both  the  new  and  the  privatized  sectors become 
unprofitable  and close  down. 
The  details  of the  end  process  depend  on  the  specific corner condi- 
tions,  but  the  basic  lesson  is  general.  Too  fast  a rate  of  restructuring, 
even  if the direct effect of restructuring is to increase output,  i.e., even  if 
ky  >  x,  can  lead  to  too  high  a level  of unemployment  and  derail the 
transition;  this  is because  the  indirect  effects  of  restructuring  through 
unemployment  decrease  private job creation and eventually  lead to the 
collapse  of the private sector. 
(2) If the speed  is less than this maximum, the case drawn in Figure 1, 
there are two equilibria, UA and  UB. The lower equilibrium is stable, the 
higher one unstable. If the initial net decrease in employment  is so large 
that  UO  is to the  right of  UB, then  private job creation is insufficient  to 
avoid  a  further  increase  in  unemployment  and,  again,  the  eventual 
collapse  of the  private  sector. But, as long  as the  initial level  of unem- 
ployment,  UO, is  less  than  UB,  the  economy  converges  to  the  lower 
level  of unemployment  UA. 
At that  unemployment  rate, flows  in  and  out  of unemployment  are 
equal.  The  private  sector  grows  steadily  from two  sources,  restructur- 
ing/privatization,  sX,  and  private  job  creation,  H.  Unemployment 
remains  at  UA  until  restructuring  has  been  achieved,  and  the  state 
sector has been  fully  transformed.  An increase  in the  speed  of restruc- 
turing leads  to an increase  in unemployment  and to an increase in the 
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This  concludes  our  first pass  at  the  dynamics.  We  now  extend  the 
model,  first by looking  more closely  at private job creation, and then by 
looking  more closely  at the restructuring  decision. 
5. A Forward-Looking  Private  Sector 
As we  pointed  out earlier, private job creation is likely to be, at least in 
part, forward  looking.  Even  if  current  profits  are  high,  many  private 
firms,  and  especially  foreign  direct  investors,  will  not  invest  if  they 
expect  conditions  to deteriorate  and profits to shrink in the future. But 
in  turn,  profits  in  the  future  may  be  low  if  private  job  creation  is 
insufficient  to avoid  rising unemployment. 
To explore  this interaction,  we  modify  our description  of private job 
creation, Equation (2), to read 
H =  arV  (10) 
rV =  (y  -  z  -  w)  +  dV/dt,  (11) 
where  V is the value  of a new  private job. Job creation now  depends  on 
the  value  of  a  new  job.  The  value  of  a new  job  follows  an  arbitrage 
equation,  which  implies  that  it  is  the  present  value  of  profit,  the 
difference  between  y  and direct and indirect costs, (w  +  z).27 
Under  these  assumptions,  the  dynamics  reduce  to two  equations,  in 
U and V: 
dU/dt  =  s(1  -  X)  -  arV  (12) 
rV=  f(U)/a  +  [U/(U  + ca)]dV/dt,  (13) 
where  f(U)  is defined  as before (Equation 9). 
The dynamics  are characterized  in Figure 2. The locus (dU/dt  =  0) is 
a  horizontal  line  in  the  V -  U  space,  at  V =  s(l  -  X)/ar,  such  that 
private  job  creation  is  equal  to  the  flow  into  unemployment  from 
restructuring. The locus (dV/dt  =  0) is given  by V = f(U)/ar  and, thus, 
has  the  same  properties  as  the  f(U)  locus  characterized  in  Figure  1. 
27. This is where we can sketch the alternative  formalization  of the cost of unemploy- 
ment in  terms of  its  effect on  the  probability that reform ends. Let  p  be  the 
instantaneous  probability  that reform  ends and that profits  become,  say, equal to zero. 
The  equation  giving  the  evolution  of  V  is  then  (r +  p)V =  (y  -  z -  w) +  dV/dt. 
Putting b and z both equal to zero so as to eliminate the effect of unemployment 
through  taxation, and assuming  instead  that p increases with  unemployment,  say that 
p = U/(1  -  U), leads to conclusions  similar  to those presented in the text. Analytics of Transition ?  301 
Figure 2 DYNAMICS  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  WITH  A FORWARD-LOOKING 
PRIVATE  SECTOR 
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Figure 2 is drawn on the assumption  that the two loci intersect, that the 
speed  of  restructuring  is  less  than  the  maximum  speed.  We  limit 
ourselves  to this case here. 
There  are now  (at least)  two  equilibrium  paths.  A complete  descrip- 
tion  of  the  possible  configurations  goes  beyond  what  we  want  to  do 
here  and  would  be  of  little  interest.28 One  possible  configuration  is 
given  in Figure 2. 
The first path  is given  by  TT, the  saddle  point  path  associated  with 
the  lower  unemployment  equilibrium,  UA. Suppose  that  initial unem- 
ployment  is equal to  U0. The economy  starts at point  C and converges 
over time to A. Current profits are positive;  together  with  anticipations 
of positive  profits in  the  future,  they  lead  to private  job creation,  and 
unemployment  decreases  to  UA. Transition  proceeds  from  then  on  at 
constant  unemployment  UA until restructuring has been  achieved. 
But there is also a path where  self-fulfilling pessimism  leads to failure 
of the transition. This is the path T'T', which  goes  to D instead. Starting 
from  the  same  unemployment  rate,  U0, there  are  two  other  possible 
evolutions,  one  starting  at  C',  and  one  starting  at  C", both  on  T'T'. 
Along  the  path  starting from C', expectations  of profit are sufficient to 
lead to enough  job creation for a while.  But eventually,  unemployment 
28. While A is a saddle point, point B can be either a sink or a node. This determines  the 
dynamic  properties  of the model, in particular  the number  of paths from  a given level 
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increases, leading  to the collapse  of the private sector and the failure of 
transition.29 Along  the path  starting at C", anticipations  of future profit 
are even  lower, and job creation is insufficient to prevent  the increase in 
unemployment.  Eventually  again, the private sector collapses. 
Multiple  equilibria and  self-fulfilling  pessimism  are not  a theoretical 
novelty.  But they  capture  the flavor of an important  element  of transi- 
tion, in particular the interaction between  foreign direct investment  and 
unemployment.  The  fear of  high  unemployment  and  a political  back- 
lash has led to low  foreign  direct investment  in some  central European 
countries.  But low  foreign  direct investment  has led  in turn to smaller 
private  sector  growth,  higher  unemployment,  and  a  higher  risk  of 
political backlash. 
The  results  also  have  policy  implications.  Within  the  logic  of  our 
model,  there  is  no  sense  in  which  a lower  speed,  s,  makes  the  good 
outcome  more  likely.  But the  government  can  announce  a policy  that 
eliminates  the  bad  outcome.  Announcing  that  restructuring  will  be 
suspended  if unemployment  crosses some threshold  level  of unemploy- 
ment-any  point  between  UA  and  UB-achieves  this  result.  Under 
such  an announcement,  the only  perfect foresight  path is TT, the good 
path. 
Thus, in order to avoid  self-fulfilling  forecasts of the failure of transi- 
tion, e.g., by foreign  investors,  the  government  may want  to announce 
a flexible  policy,  i.e., announce  that the  rate of restructuring  will  slow 
down  if  unemployment  gets  too  high.  Flexibility  in  the  speed  of 
restructuring makes ultimate  transition more credible. 
Again, this result must come  with  a number of caveats. 
First, our assumption  that state firms can stay in a holding  pattern is 
important  here. It implies  that the only  cost of delayed  restructuring is 
the  opportunity  cost  of  delayed  higher  productivity,  and  it  poses  no 
threat to the ultimate  transition. If, absent restructuring, firms' employ- 
ment  decreased,  there  would  potentially  be  risks  from  maintaining 
either too  high  or too low a speed  of restructuring.30 
Second,  and  closely  related,  flexibility  in  the  speed  of  restructuring 
does  not mean,  in our model,  increasing  subsidies  to state firms. But in 
practice, the line between  the two  is a thin one; more flexibility may be 
read by  private  firms as implying  higher  transfers, overt  or covert,  to 
state firms in the future, and thus lead  to less private job creation. 
Third,  the  government  may  have  little  choice  than  to  be  flexible 
anyway.  If unemployment  is high,  workers  in  state firms are likely  to 
29.  At point  D, the  private sector closes  and unemployment  jumps. 
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strongly  oppose  any  measure  that  puts  them  at  risk  of  becoming 
unemployed.  This takes us to our last extension,  the endogenization  of 
the  speed  of restructuring. 
6. Endogenous  Restructuring 
As we  showed  earlier, the belief  at the beginning  of the reform process 
that governments  could  choose  the  speed  of privatization  and restruc- 
turing  was  wrong.  Privatization  has  turned  out  to  require  workers' 
approval.  What  "workers'  approval"  means  is  ambiguous,  however, 
and this raises a number  of issues,  which  we  take up first.31 
6.1 THE  DECISION  PROCESS  WITHIN  STATE  FIRMS 
Let VE be  the  value  for a worker  of being  employed  in the  unrestruc- 
tured state sector. Let, as before,  Vu be the value  of being  unemployed. 
Assume,  in  line  with  our  earlier assumption  that  restructuring  comes 
with  privatization,  that wages  in  restructured/privatized  firms are set 
in the  same way  as in the rest of the private sector. The value  of being 
employed  in the  restructured  firm is then  the  same  as that of working 
in the new  private sector, and we  can use the same symbol for both,  VN. 
Recall that restructuring  implies  that  a proportion  k of  the  workers 
will  remain  employed  after restructuring,  and  a proportion  1 -  k will 
become  unemployed. 
If all workers  perceive  an equal probability of keeping  their job after 
restructuring,  then-under  the  assumption  of  risk  neutrality,  an  as- 
sumption  that  we  have  made  implicitly  until  now  in  defining  the 
various  value  functions  as linear in wages  and benefits-the  condition 
for restructuring will be 
VIN  +  (1  -  )VU  V  V .  (14) 
For  restructuring  to  occur,  the  expected  value  after  restructuring 
must be greater than or equal to the value  absent restructuring. 
In  most  firms, the  assumption  that  workers  choose  under  a veil  of 
ignorance  is clearly wrong,  however.  In most cases, it is easy to identify 
parts  of  the  firm that  will  surely  have  to  close.  What  happens  then 
depends  on  the decision  process  within  the firm. If those  workers who 
know  they  will  lose  their  jobs  can  be  fully  compensated,  through 
31.  These issues  are closely  related to how  to buy off stakeholders  in top-down  privatiza- 
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severance  pay,  however,  by  those  who  are likely  to  keep  theirs,  then 
the condition  will be the same as earlier. 
Compensation  of losers  may be limited,  and  workers  who  are likely 
to  lose  their job as a result  of  restructuring  will  oppose  restructuring. 
Under  the  extreme  assumption  of  unanimity  and  no-transfers,  the 
condition  for restructuring becomes 
VU  2  VE.  (15) 
Even  those  who  lose  their  jobs  must  be  no  worse  off  as- a  result  of 
restructuring. But this is not the only  possible  outcome.  If decisions  are 
closer  to  majority  voting,  and  K is  greater  than  one-half,  then  the 
decision  is  determined  by  those  who  know  they  will  keep  their jobs, 
and the  condition  becomes 
VN 2  VE.  (16) 
Which  condition  applies  has  an important  effect  on both  the  speed  of 
restructuring, and the nature of unemployment.  Note  that under condi- 
tion  (15), for example,  the  unemployed  are no  worse  off than  those  in 
state  firms, while  they  are  under  the  other  two  conditions.  The  evi- 
dence  on  bargaining  within  state  firms is  not  sufficiently  well  estab- 
lished  for us to be very  confident.32 We shall work with  condition  (14) 
and  mention  what  would  happen  if one  of  the  other  conditions  was 
used  instead. 
6.2 THE  TRANSITION  UNDER  ENDOGENOUS  RESTRUCTURING 
Leaving  aside  details-to  be given  later-the  transition under  endoge- 
nous  restructuring  is as follows: 
From its initial value,  UO,  unemployment  converges  to an equilibrium 
value,  U*. This value  is associated  with  an equilibrium speed  of restruc- 
turing  s*. Restructuring then  proceeds  at that speed,  generating  a flow 
into  unemployment  equal  to  private  job  creation.  This  goes  on  until 
restructuring has been  achieved,  and all employment  in the economy  is 
private. 
(1)  It is  easiest  to  start with  a  characterization  of  U*  and  s*,  the 
equilibrium  unemployment,  and  speed  of  restructuring,  and  then  de- 
scribe the adjustment  from  U0 to  U*. 
32. Indeed, our discussion does not take into account the role and the bargaining of 
managers in firms. We further explore the decision process within state firms in 
Aghion et al. (1993). Analytics  of Transition  ?  305 
Along  the  transition  path  associated  with  U*  and  s*,  all variables 
that  affect the  values  VE,  Vu, VN are constant  (only  the  composition  of 
employment  is changing),  so that VE,  Vu, VN are also constant.33 
The  value  of being  employed  in  a state  firm absent  restructuring  is 
given  by 
rVE =  WE =  x -  z,  (17) 
where  wE is the wage  in state firms. In the absence  of owners,  workers 
appropriate  all  rents,  so  that  the  wage  is  equal  to  x,  the  average 
product,  minus  z, taxes per worker. 
From Equations (4) and  (5), and  the  condition  that VN =  Vu + c, the 
values  of  being  unemployed  and  of  being  employed  in  the  private 
sector, respectively,  are given  by 
rVN =  w  (18) 
rVu =  w -  rc.  (19) 
When  Equation (14) holds  as an equality, using  Equations (17) to (19) to 
eliminate  VE, VN, and Vu gives 
x -  z =  kw +  (1  -  X)(w  -  cr).  (20) 
As  the  wage  depends  on  the  level  of  unemployment,  this  implicitly 
characterizes  equilibrium  unemployment,  U*.  Unemployment  must be 
such  that  the  wage  in  the  state  sector,  the  left-hand  side  of  Equation 
(20), is  equal  to  the  probability  of  keeping  the  job  after restructuring 
times  the  private  wage,  plus  the  probability  of becoming  unemployed 
times the flow  utility  of being  unemployed. 
To solve  explicitly  for  U*,  note  that, from Equation (2), the  wage  w 
can be  expressed  as  y -  z -  f(U*)/a.  Replacing  the  wage  in Equation 
(20) and rearranging gives 
f(U*)  =  a(y  -  x -  (1  -  )cr).  (21) 
This equation  defines  equilibrium  unemployment, U*. 
33.  We  cheat  here  by  using  in  effect  a  turnpike  approximation.  Those  variables  are 
constant  until  restructuring  comes  to  an  end;  when  restructuring  comes  to an  end, 
however,  the flow into unemployment  stops, and unemployment  decreases asymptot- 
ically to zero  as a result  of private job creation.  This implies  that the  V's, which  are 
forward looking,  change  before  the  end  of restructuring. Far away  enough  from the 
end,  however,  these  anticipation  effects  are small. Thus, we  ignore  them  in order to 
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By  using  this  relation,  and  the  condition  that  flows  in  and  out  of 
unemployment  are equal, the  equilibrium  speed of restructuring, s*, is in 
turn given  by 
(1  -  X)s*  = a(y  -  x -  (1  -  X)cr).  (22) 
(2) It is easy to derive, along the equilibrium path, the values  of being 
employed  in each of the two  sectors and of being  unemployed. 
Equation  (14),  together  with  the  efficiency  wage  condition  that 
VN -  V  =  c, implies  the following  relation between  VN, VE,  and Vu: 
VN >  VE=  VN-  (1  -  )c  >VU  VN-  c.  (23) 
Those  employed  in  the  private  sector  are  better  off  than  those  em- 
ployed  in  the  state  sector,  who  are in  turn better  off than  the  unem- 
ployed.  The higher is the unemployment  rate; the lower is each of these 
three values. 
(3)  Figure  3  characterizes  equilibrium  unemployment  and  speed.  It 
plots  both  sides  of  Equation  (21)  against  unemployment.  Private  job 
creation,  f(U),  is, as before, first upward,  then  downward  sloping.  The 
right-hand  side is a horizontal  line, at a(y  -  x -  (1 -  X)cr). 
We  have  drawn  Figure  3 so  that  the  horizontal  line  intersects  f(U) 
twice.  There  are  two  other  possible  cases,  which  we  briefly  mention. 
The first arises when  the right hand side of Equation (21) is negative.  In 
Figure  3 DYNAMICS  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  UNDER  ENDOGENOUS 
RESTRUCTURING 
f(U)=aca  (y-cr-  i- ib) 
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that  case,  even  at  zero  unemployment,  workers  in  state  firms find  it 
more  attractive  not  to  restructure.  Thus,  no  restructuring  takes  place. 
The  initial  unemployment,  UO, is  absorbed  over  time  by  private  job 
creation,  and  the  process  then  stops.  The second  case  arises when  the 
horizontal  line  is  higher  than  maximum  private  job  creation.  At  any 
unemployment  rate, workers in state firms want  to restructure. Neither 
case strikes us as capturing  what  has happened. 
If we  leave  aside  those  two  cases, the  horizontal  line  intersects  f(U) 
twice, so that there are two  equilibria, UA and  UB. As before, the higher 
unemployment  equilibrium  is  unstable.  Unless  initial  unemployment 
exceeds  UB, the economy  converges  to  UA. 
If UO  is less than  UA, unemployment  jumps to  UA. The probability of 
finding  a private  job  and  the  private  wage  are both  sufficiently  high 
that  workers  in  state  firms prefer  to restructure  even  if this  may  lead 
them  to become  unemployed.  This adjustment  is in the  spirit of recent 
models,  such as those  sketched  by Kehoe in his discussion  of this paper, 
in which  unemployment  comes  from the  attractiveness  for workers  in 
low-productivity  firms  to  search  for  high-productivity  jobs.  In  our 
model,  unemployment  increases  to  the  point  where  the  probability  of 
getting  a private job when  unemployed  falls enough  to make  workers 
in state firms indifferent between  restructuring or not restructuring. But 
one  can think of other mechanisms,  and some of them are presented  by 
Kehoe. 
The more empirically relevant  case appears to us to be the other one, 
where  UO is larger than  UA. In that  case,  high  unemployment  makes 
restructuring  and  privatization  unattractive  to  workers  in  state  firms. 
Thus, no restructuring takes place until private job creation has reduced 
unemployment  to  UA. From then  on, the economy  transits at U*  =  UA 
at speed  s* = f(UA). 
6.3 COMPARATIVE  STATICS 
(1)  Suppose  that  the  government  is  able,  say,  through  explicit  wage 
controls,  to  decrease  rent appropriation  in  state firms. We can capture 
this by  assuming  that workers  in  state firms now  receive  only  ax  -  z, 
where  a  is less than one.34 
The horizontal  line in Figure 3 shifts up, but the locus corresponding 
to f(U)  is unchanged.  The effect is to increase both  equilibrium unem- 
ployment  and  the  speed  of  restructuring.  Lower  rent  appropriation 
34. This raises  the possibility  of using profits  from state firms,  which are positive if ca  < 1, 
to finance expenditures,  such as unemployment  benefits.  We have not explored that 
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makes restructuring and privatization  relatively more attractive, leading 
to an increase  in unemployment,  until workers  in state firms are again 
indifferent  between  restructuring  or not  restructuring.  As  equilibrium 
unemployment  is on the upward-sloping  part of  f(U),  the net effect of 
higher  unemployment  is to increase  private job creation and the speed 
of restructuring. 
This is the  effect,  however,  when  the  economy  is already  at  U*.  If, 
e.g., initial unemployment  U0 is larger than  U*,  then  workers  in state 
firms strictly prefer not  to restructure. This is because  high  unemploy- 
ment  implies  both  a  low  private  wage  and  a  low  exit  rate  from 
unemployment,  two  factors  that  make  restructuring  less  attractive.  In 
this case, (small)  decreases  in  a  make  state workers  worse  off but  still 
do  not  lead  to  restructuring.  Thus,  in  the  adjustment  of  the  economy 
from  U0 to  U*, the  effect of a decrease  in  a  is to decrease  the wage  of 
state workers,  but  it has  no  effect  on  the  evolution  of unemployment. 
(2)  The  distinction  between  the  effects  of  a change  in  a parameter 
depending  on whether  the economy  is or is not yet at U*  is even  more 
striking in the case of unemployment  benefits. 
Suppose  that the economy  is at  U*  and that unemployment  benefits 
are increased.  The  f(U)  locus  shifts downward,  and the horizontal  line 
is  unaffected.  Thus,  higher  unemployment  benefits  lead  to  higher 
unemployment  but leave  the speed  of restructuring unaffected.  Indeed, 
the effect of higher  unemployment  benefits is to decrease  the welfare  of 
the  unemployed:  The  increase  in  benefits  is  more  than  offset  by  the 
decrease  in  employment  prospects.35 This result  is  reminiscent  of  the 
Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  model  and  indeed  has  the  same  causes: 
Making  unemployment  less  unattractive  leads  to  higher  equilibrium 
unemployment,  not necessarily  higher  welfare  of the unemployed. 
But  the  effects  of  benefits  are quite  different  as long  as unemploy- 
ment  is greater than  U*. In this  case, marginal  changes  in benefits  do 
not  trigger  restructuring.  Higher  benefits  lead  to  higher  wages  and 
lower  private job creation.  Whether  they  lead  to higher  instantaneous 
utility  for the  unemployed  is ambiguous:  Higher  unemployment  bene- 
fits may be more than offset by the decrease  in the  exit rate. 
6.4 A NORMATIVE  ANALYSIS 
Looking  at the  effects  of policies  on  restructuring  and  unemployment 
raises  the  question  of  what  the  government  should  do.  This  in  turn 
35.  To see that, note  that the  value  of being  employed  in the  state sector decreases  with 
unemployment-because  unemployment  leads  to  higher  taxes-and  that  the  three 
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raises  two  other  questions.  What  should  the  government  maximize? 
And what  tools  does  it have  at its disposal? 
We  assume  here  that  the  government  maximizes  the  present  dis- 
counted  value  of output.  Thus, we  shall focus on efficiency and give  no 
weight  to income  or unemployment  distribution. 
This leaves  open  the issue  of what  the  government  takes as given  in 
solving  its optimization  problem. There is a sense  in which  the govern- 
ment  can  affect  most  of  the  parameters  we  have  defined  so  far. For 
example,  the  strength  of  the  effect  of  profit  on  private  sector  job 
creation,  the  parameter  a, must  depend  in part on  the  organization  of 
credit  markets,  which  the  government  can  improve.  But allowing  the 
government  to choose  a freely clearly makes the  optimization  problem 
both trivial and unrealistic. Thus, we  assume  that the government  takes 
the system  of unemployment  benefits, the wage  determination  process, 
and the equation  for private job creation, as given.  This implies that the 
government  takes the function  dN/dt  = f(U)  as given  and chooses  the 
rate of restructuring. It can do this in our model,  through  changes  in a, 
or by imposing  top-down  privatization  and restructuring, or by chang- 
ing  decision  rules within  firms. We shall not  specify  how  at this point 
and just take the speed  of restructuring as the control variable. 
Finally,  we  assume,  for  simplicity,  that  k  equals  zero,  so  that  the 
question  becomes  at what rate to close-rather  than restructure-firms. 
This makes the algebra simpler, and little is lost in the process. 
1.  Optimal  unemployment  and  speed 
Under  the assumptions  above,  the  government  maximizes 
0o 
max l  (Ex  +  Ny-  (1/2ar)H2)et  dt  (24) 
subject to 
1 =  E + N +  U;  H =  dN/dt  = f(U).  (25) 
The only  term that deserves  comment  is the third term in the objective 
function.  It captures the cost of creating private jobs and is quadratic in 
job creation; it is this cost function  that implicitly underlies  the relation 
between  job creation and profit we  postulated  earlier. 
Solving  this  maximization  problem  gives  the  following  characteriza- 
tion  of optimal  unemployment,  U**: 
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The interpretation  of Equation (26) is straightforward. Closing one  state 
job leads  to a flow  loss  of  x. The increase  in unemployment  leads  to a 
marginal  increase  in  private  job  creation  of  f'(U**).  The  additional 
flow  output  associated  with  a  private  job  is  equal  to  y,  minus  the 
marginal cost of job creation,  f(U**)/ar.  Therefore, the term in brackets 
gives  the present  value  of replacing  a state job by a private job. 
The solution  is for the government  to achieve  U** and the associated 
speed  of  closing,  s** = f(U**).  If  U**  is  less  than  initial  unemploy- 
ment  U?, then  the optimal policy is not to start closing  until unemploy- 
ment  has declined  to  U**. 
2.  Now  compare  this optimal  solution  to equilibrium  U*. 
Starting  from  VE =  Vu, the  restructuring  condition  when  X =  0,  and 
Equations (4), (5), and (17), gives: 
x -  z =  b +  (f(U*)/U*)(w  -  x + z)/r.  (27) 
Using  Equation (2) to eliminate  w gives  an implicit  characterization  of 
equilibrium  unemployment: 
x -  z =  b +  (f(U*)/U*)[(y  -  (f(U*)/a)  -  x)/r].  (28) 
The  interpretation  of  Equation  (28)  is  also  straightforward.  Closing  a 
state job costs  the  worker  x -  z. If she becomes  unemployed,  she  gets 
unemployment  benefit  b and faces a probability f(U*)/U*  of getting  a 
private job. The term in brackets is the  present  value  of the  difference 
between  private and  the  state wages. 
All that  remains  to  be  done  is  to  compare  Equations  (26) and  (28). 
There are three differences;  all three imply  that equilibrium unemploy- 
ment  is  larger  than  is  optimal.  The  first is  the  presence  of  taxes,  z, 
which  reduce  the  relative  attractiveness  of  state  jobs  compared  with 
unemployment.  The second  is the presence  of unemployment  benefits, 
which  have  the  same  effect.  The  third  is  the  presence  of  f(U*)/U* 
rather  than  f'(U*)  in  Equation  (28).  While  the  marginal  effect  of 
unemployment  on  private  job  creation,  f'(U),  is  what  is  relevant  for 
optimal  unemployment,  what  matters to workers  is the  average  effect 
f(U)/U.  By concavity  of f('),  the marginal effect is always  smaller than 
the  average  effect; this factor leads  again to too  high  unemployment.36 
36.  This  effect  plays  an  important  role  in  Gavin  (1993),  where  f(U)  reflects  matching 
considerations. Analytics  of Transition  ?  311 
This normative  analysis  comes  with  the  clear warning  that it surely 
takes too much of the environment  as given.  Differential taxation of the 
private  and  state  sector  would,  e.g.,  allow  the  government  to  modify 
f(U),  which  we  have taken as given. As it is, it suggests  that equilibrium 
unemployment  may be  too  high  and  that measures  be  taken  to lower 
it.37 
7. Returning  to Poland  and Central  Europe 
7.1 ON  POLAND 
One  of the two cases we  characterized in the previous  section was such 
that the initial level  of unemployment  exceeded  equilibrium unemploy- 
ment.  As a result, there was  no  restructuring  until  private job creation 
had reduced  unemployment  to its equilibrium value. 
We believe  that this is an accurate, if rough,  description  of what  has 
happened  so far in Poland.  The evidence  suggests  that the  unemploy- 
ment  that  has  resulted  from  labor  shedding  far  exceeds  equilibrium 
unemployment:  The  exit  rate  from  unemployment  to  employment  is 
extremely  low;  private wages  are lower  than wages  in state firms. It is 
not  surprising  that workers  in most  state firms are resisting  restructur- 
ing and  the associated  risks of unemployment. 
Our model  makes  a clear forecast. Restructuring will  remain limited, 
until  private  job  creation  has  sufficiently  reduced  the  unemployment 
rate to make  restructuring  less  unattractive.  We  also believe  that fore- 
cast to  be  right.  One  qualification  comes  from the  geographic  hetero- 
geneity,  which  is not  in  our model,  but is very  relevant  in practice. In 
the  major cities,  unemployment  is lower,  and  those  labor markets are 
probably  close  to  our  description  of  equilibrium  unemployment,  with 
both  restructuring  and  private  job  creation.  The  rest  of  the  country 
corresponds  more  closely  to  our  case  where  unemployment  exceeds 
equilibrium  unemployment.  Unemployment  is much  higher,  and  there 
is much  resistance  to restructuring. This heterogeneity  smooths,  at the 
aggregate  level,  the sharp distinction  present  in our model  between  the 
cases where  unemployment  is at or above  its equilibrium value. 
When  and  how  fast can one  expect  unemployment  to decline?  This 
depends  mainly  on two  factors. The first is how  much  more labor state 
37.  When  X is  positive,  the  algebra  is more  intricate, but  the  same  three  effects  are at 
work.  One  can  then  examine  the  implications  of  the  alternative  conditions  for 
restructuring  we  discussed  earlier. Using  the  condition  that even  those  unemployed 
be  as well  off works  in  the  opposite  direction  from the  three  effects listed  earlier. It 
leads, other things equal, to too low  a level of unemployment  and to too slow  a speed 
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firms still need  to  shed  in  order  to  survive.  (In our  model,  this  labor 
shedding  is instantaneous;  but,  as we  showed  earlier, this has been  in 
fact  a drawn-out  process.)  Our  reading  of  the  evidence  suggests  that 
this  process  may be nearly  achieved.  The  second  is the  rate of private 
job creation. The numbers  we  presented  in Table 2 are not  reassuring: 
Net  private job creation in private firms with  more than five employees 
from 1992 to  1993 was  only  0.1 million,  compared  with  an unemploy- 
ment  pool  of  2.8  million.  While  the  message  from  this  number  is 
probably overly  pessimistic,  this  suggests  a slow  decline  in unemploy- 
ment.  This  raises  the  issue  of  whether  the  increasing  importance  of 
long-term  unemployment  may  change  the  relation  between  wage  set- 
ting and unemployment  as it has in Western Europe. This also suggests 
the  importance  of  foreign  direct  investment,  which  is  crucial  to  the 
creation and  expansion  of medium-size  private firms. 
Forecasts for productivity  growth  must  also be  modest.  Labor shed- 
ding  led  to large gains  in productivity  in 1993, and  more may come  in 
1994. But limited  restructuring  of  state firms, at least  until  unemploy- 
ment  has significantly  decreased,  also implies  that, despite  the potential 
for  further  large  gains  in  productivity,  these  will  not  be  realized  any 
time soon. 
What should  the government  do?38 
The  obvious  implication  of our model  is that measures  to accelerate 
private  job creation  dominate  measures  aimed  at accelerating  restruc- 
turing  of  state  firms.  Given  the  current  unemployment  rate,  faster 
restructuring, even  if it could be achieved-and  we  have  argued  this is 
unlikely  to  be  the  case-may  lead  to  a  level  of  unemployment  that 
adversely  affects transition. 
The  conclusion  that  restructuring  not  only  will,  but  also  can, wait 
clearly depends  on our assumption  that, after the initial labor shedding, 
38. There  is at least one important  dimension of policy that our model is not designed to 
address,  and to which we do not know the answer.  It is the potential  role of demand 
policies in maintaining  or increasing  employment  in state firms.  The general  principle 
is that firms  dominated  by insiders  are more likely to respond to increases  in demand 
by increasing  prices  rather  than by increasing  output and employment;  this is because 
workers who are already employed put little weight on additional employment for 
others. However, this is tempered at this point by the fact that, in many firms,  the 
number of insiders still exceeds the feasible level of employment; in those firms, 
increases in demand are likely to lead to an increase in output, and an increase in 
employment. 
The evidence from 1993 is encouraging here. The proximate  cause of growth in 
1993  was an increase  in domestic consumption  spending;  this was accommodated  by 
firms  by an increase in output, a smaller  decrease in employment than would have 
taken place otherwise, and a large increase in productivity  growth. There was no 
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state  firms can  stay  in  a  holding  pattern  for  some  time.  This  in  fact 
depends  on both market conditions  (Will foreign competition  intensify?) 
and on internal decisions  (Will workers be willing,  able to maintain  the 
capital stock?). And this in turn raises the issue  of whether  the govern- 
ment  can take measures  to allow  firms to stay in  this holding  pattern. 
Privatization  through  liquidation,  for example,  increases  the horizon  of 
workers  by  making  them  shareholders;  but  as  we  have  seen,  it  may 
decrease  rather  than  increase  access  to  outside  finance.  Our  model 
implies  that  capital  privatization  with  employment  commitments  by 
firms may actually be desirable.39 
7.2 ON CENTRAL  EUROPE 
The broad characteristics of transition in Poland,  as we  described  them 
in  Section  2,  are  shared  by  the  other  reforming  Central  European 
countries.  But there  are also  some  important  differences,  most  notably 
in  unemployment  rates.  One  question  is  whether  our  model  can  not 
only help explain the common  evolutions  but also the differences across 
countries. 
Basic numbers  are presented  in Tables 4 and 5 for Poland,  Hungary, 
Slovakia, the  Czech  Republic, and Bulgaria.40 
Table 4 presents  the evolution  of employment-total,  state, private-, 
of unemployment,  and  of industrial  production.  The numbers  for em- 
ployment  and unemployment  are presented  as changes  since the begin- 
ning  of  reform,  normalized  by  the  initial  labor  force.41 The  "ratio" 
variable gives  the ratio of the change  in unemployment  to the negative 
of the change  in employment.  It provides  a rough  index of whether  the 
decrease  in  employment  has been  reflected  in a change  in unemploy- 
ment  or  in  a  change  in  labor force  participation.42 Finally,  to  give  a 
39.  Indeed,  most  capital  privatizations  in  Poland  have  come  with  such-but  rather 
limited-commitments. 
40.  Again,  we  cannot  present  historical  evolutions.  Our purpose  is only  to confront  our 
model  to the broad facts in those  countries. This section is based in part on Blanchard 
et  al. (1993),  which  is  itself  based  on  specific  country  studies  under  a World  Bank 
project on labor markets in Central and Eastern Europe. 
41.  As our discussion  of the Polish numbers earlier made clear, private and state employ- 
ment  numbers  raise  issues  of  both  definition  and  measurement.  A  decline  in  state 
employment  may  reflect classification  changes,  privatization,  or declines  in  employ- 
ment  in existing  state firms. To the  extent we  could  correct for classification changes, 
we  have,  and the numbers presented  are mostly  free of classification changes.  Except 
for small-scale privatization  of shops,  the numbers are also not very much affected by 
privatization-which  has been  limited in scale in most countries, and the implications 
of which  we  exclude  by construction  for the Czech  Republic. 
42.  It is  only  a  rough  index  because  a  value  of  one  may  reflect  either  no  change  in 
participation, or a decrease  in participation  together  with  the entry of new  cohorts in 
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Table  4  EMPLOYMENT,  STATE  AND PRIVATE,  UNEMPLOYMENT, 
INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION 
Change 
Industrial 
Total  E  State E  Private  E  U  Ratio  Production 
Poland  (a)  -12.6  -20.3  7.7  14.2  1.12  71.5 
Hungary  (b)  -13.0  -34.0  21.0  14.1  1.17  62.3 
Slovakia (b)  -12.8  -22.7  10.0  10.4  0.81  61.3 
Czech Rep (c)  -8.8  (-16.1)  (10.7)  2.5  0.28  59.6 
Bulgaria (b)  -24.0  -  34.7  10.7  14.0  0.58  47.0 
All changes expressed as ratios to the initial labor force. "Ratio" is the ratio of the change in 
unemployment to the negative of the change in employment. The industrial production index 
is equal to 100 in 1989. 
Source:  Blanchard et al. (1993). (a) 1992 over 1989; state employment includes cooperatives. (b) 
1992 over 1990. (c) Change in total employment: 1992 over 1990. Changes in state and private 
employment: 1991 over 1990. Large-scale  privatization leads in 1992 to a further shift of 22% of 
the labor force from state to private employment. 
Table  5  PRIVATE  /  STATE  WAGE  RATIOS  AND EXIT  RATES 
FROM  UNEMPLOYMENT 
Wage  ratio  Exit  rate  (%) 
Poland  0.86  2.3 
Hungary  0.93  3.0 
CSFR  1.08 
Slovakia  4.8 
Czech Rep  18.0 
Bulgaria  1.16  1.1 
Source:  Blanchard et al. (1993). Wage ratio: ratio of average private wage  to 
average state wage, for 1993. Exit rate: monthly exit rate from unemployment 
to employment, 1992 average. 
sense  of the size of the shock that has affected the industrial sector, the 
last column  gives  the industrial  production  index. 
Table 5 gives  numbers for two  of the variables that play an important 
role  in  our  model,  the  wage  in  the  private  sector  relative  to  the  state 
sector, and the exit rate from unemployment  to employment.43 
These tables-and  the larger body  of evidence-suggest  a three-way 
classification: The experience  of Hungary  and  Slovakia appear broadly 
similar to that of Poland. In all three countries,  employment  is down  by 
43.  Issues of measurement  also apply  to the wage  ratio, which  does  not take into account 
fringe  benefits  (which  are  higher  in  the  state  sector),  and  does  not  adjust  for 
composition  effects.  The  study  by  Commander  et  al.  (1993)  on  Hungary,  which 
controls for worker  and industry  characteristics, finds private and state hourly  wages 
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about 12% from its pre-reform level; this reflects a much larger decrease 
in  state  employment,  only  partly  offset  by  an  increase  in  private  em- 
ployment.44 Unemployment  has increased roughly  one for one with  the 
decrease  in  employment.  In  all  three  countries,  the  exit  rate  from 
unemployment  to  employment  is  very  low,  from  2.3% in  Poland  to 
4.8% in Slovakia. 
Other  aspects  appear  to fit as well.  After a rapid initial increase,  the 
rate  of  private  job  creation  is  low:  Measured  private  employment  in 
Hungary  and  Slovakia  were  nearly  the  same  in  1992  as  in  1991.45 
Privatization is nearly at a standstill. The prognosis  is broadly similar to 
that  of  Poland.  The  current  level  of  unemployment  appears  to  far 
exceed  equilibrium  unemployment.  Labor productivity  in  industry  is 
roughly  back  to  its  pre-reform  level,  so  that  there  may  not  be  much 
more  labor shedding  needed  for the  remaining  firms to  survive,  and 
unemployment  may  not  increase  further.  From  then  on,  private  job 
creation  is  likely  to  slowly  decrease  unemployment.  Restructuring  is 
likely  to remain limited  for some  time to come. 
Looking  at unemployment,  the  next  country  in  Table 4,  the  Czech 
Republic, appears  to be  doing  much  better: The unemployment  rate is 
below  3%. The exit rate from unemployment  to employment  is equal to 
18% per month,  giving  a very different view  of the unemployment  pool. 
But the other numbers in Table 4 show  that the difference is in fact less 
than  first  appears.  The  decrease  in  employment  is  only  marginally 
smaller  than  in  the  countries  we  just  looked  at.  The  numbers  for 
changes  in state employment  are available up  to 1991 only; from what 
we  know  about  the  decline  in  employment  in industry  in  1992, num- 
bers for the decline  in state employment  for 1990 to 1992 surely exceed 
20% (excluding  the  effects  of  large-scale  privatization).  The  evidence 
from  the  decline  in  industrial  production  does  not  suggest  that  the 
Czech  Republic has been  hit less hard than the others by relative price 
changes  and  the  collapse  of  trade.  The  major difference  between  the 
Czech  Republic and the previous  countries  is in the ratio of the change 
in  unemployment  to  the  negative  of  the  change  in  employment;  two 
factors appear  to be  at work:  tough  unemployment  eligibility  require- 
ments,  which  have  led  workers  to  drop  out  of  the  labor  force  alto- 
gether,  as  well  as  unrecorded  private  activities.46 Were  the  ratio  of 
changes  in unemployment  to changes  in employment  equal, say, to the 
44.  The smaller increase in private employment  in Poland reflects the fact that the private 
sector was larger to start with.  Poland  is the country with  the largest share of private 
employment. 
45.  See Table 1 in Blanchard et al. (1993). 
46.  There  is  solid  evidence  of  the  first. There  is,  as  far  as  we  know,  only  anecdotal 
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value  for Poland, unemployment  in the Czech Republic would  be equal 
to 10%. Thus, while  the Czech Republic is doing  better, the difference  is 
smaller than suggested  by the unemployment  numbers. 
There  is  another  important  difference  between  the  Czech  Republic 
and  the  other  countries  in  Table 4.  Large-scale  privatization  is  being 
rapidly  implemented  and  will  imply  a  transfer  of  control  from  the 
insiders  to  outside  investors.47  Thus,  while  restructuring  has  been 
limited,  it  is  likely  to  take  place  earlier  and  at  a  higher  rate  than 
elsewhere.  This suggests  that unemployment  may  well  increase  in the 
future, as an implication  of a faster speed  of restructuring. 
The  last  country  in  Table  4  is  Bulgaria.  Its  performance  has  been 
distinctly  worse  than  that  of  the  other  countries.  The  decline  in  state 
sector employment  has been  larger, and private sector growth  has been 
limited.  Unemployment  stood  in  1992  at  14%, but  even  this  high 
number  hid  a  drop  in  participation.  Had  the  ratio  of  changes  in 
unemployment  to employment  been  the same as in Poland,  say, unem- 
ployment  would  have  stood  at 27%. (Note  that these  are numbers  for 
1992.  The  unemployment  rate  has  increased  by  another  10% since 
then.) The exit rate from unemployment  to employment  was a very low 
1.1%. The effects of the sharp decrease  in activity back on the transition 
are clear. Government  revenues,  which  stood  at 58% of  GDP in  1988 
were  down  to  34.0% in  1992; capital  expenditures  were  down  from 
8.5% to 2.6%. Privatization  is still to come.  In terms of our model,  this 
suggests  an  increase  in  the  initial  unemployment  so  far  above  the 
equilibrium  rate  (close  to  UB  in  Figure  3)  that  it  threatens  even  the 
eventual  success of the transition; high unemployment  is leading  to low 
private job creation. It will  decline  slowly  at best. 
8. Conclusions  and Extensions 
Our  purpose  in  this  paper  was  to  develop  a model  of  transition  for 
Central Europe. Our model  is based on two main assumptions.  The first 
is  that,  after  a rapid  initial  adjustment,  private  job  creation  will  take 
time  and  that it is affected  by  unemployment:  At low  levels  of unem- 
ployment,  higher  unemployment  helps  job  creation;  at higher  levels, 
higher  unemployment  hinders  and may even  destroy job creation. The 
second  is that restructuring  in  the  state sector requires  the  support  of 
47. Why insiders have  agreed to  such  a  privatization program is,  in  view  of  our 
discussion  earlier,  a very relevant  question.  Frydman  and Rapaczynski  (1993)  offer an 
interesting  answer, that managers  assumed that voucher privatization  would lead to 
decentralized  ownership  and leave them in control.  The emergence  investment  funds, 
which bought vouchers from individuals,  have proved them wrong. Most firms will 
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the insiders, so that the speed  of restructuring depends  on labor market 
conditions  as well:  In particular, high  unemployment  hinders  restruc- 
turing. 
Our model  delivers  an equilibrium rate of unemployment  and speed 
of restructuring, which  are such that the flow into unemployment  from 
restructuring is just absorbed by the rate of private job creation. It also 
implies  that the initial adjustment  can lead to an initial unemployment 
rate that  exceeds  the  equilibrium  rate. In this  case,  restructuring  does 
not  take  place  until  job  creation  has  reduced  unemployment  to  low 
levels.  If unemployment  is high,  and private creation slow,  this adjust- 
ment  will  take  a while.  We  argue  that  this  configuration  fits well  the 
experience  of most  Central European  countries. 
Our model  has a number of policy  implications.  Among  them is that, 
in  the  initial  phase  of  adjustment,  priority should  be  given  to  private 
job creation. Trying to increase the speed  of restructuring of state firms 
may  not  be  feasible-running  into  opposition  from  workers  in  state 
firms-and  may  not  be  desirable  anyway:  Even  if  restructuring  in- 
creases  output,  its  indirect  effects  through  unemployment  on  private 
job creation may make it undesirable  if unemployment  is already high. 
In laying  out  our  assumptions,  we  explained  how  we  thought  they 
captured  the  important  aspects  of transition.  In ending  this paper,  we 
want  to return to the various choices we made, some of the reservations 
we  have,  and some  of the extensions  we  want  to explore in the future. 
(1)  We  have  simply  assumed  that  state  firms  faced  a  hard  budget 
constraint. For Poland,  as well  as for the countries  we  looked  at in this 
section,  it is indeed  the  case that the  constraint  has steadily  hardened. 
But this is not true, as is well  known,  of Russia or, to a lesser degree,  of 
Romania.  And  it cannot  be  taken  for granted  that  it will  remain  true 
even  in the countries  we  have  looked  at. Bulgaria comes  to mind  here. 
A better model  would  endogenize  the softness  of the budget  constraint 
and  its transfer implications.  We believe  that it would  lead  to a better 
discussion  than  in  our model  of what  may  go  wrong,  if and  when,  in 
particular, unemployment  becomes  very  high. 
(2) We have  maintained  the  assumption  that even  absent restructur- 
ing,  state  firms  can,  after  some  initial  labor  shedding,  remain  in  a 
holding  pattern. One may instead  argue that, absent restructuring, state 
firms do  not  go  into  a holding  pattern,  but  rather are likely  to  keep 
declining.  If this is the case, our conclusions  that restructuring can wait 
may be overturned.  Both too fast and too slow  a speed  of restructuring 
can derail the transition.48 
48.  We have  started exploring  this in Aghion  and Blanchard (1994). 318 *  AGHION  &  BLANCHARD 
(3) We have  ignored  heterogeneity  across state firms in both  shocks 
and restructuring prospects.  This leads in our model  to a sharp distinc- 
tion between  two  phases,  the  cases where  unemployment  is greater or 
equal to its equilibrium value.  This distinction  is too sharp. Heterogene- 
ity would  smooth  those  phases.  More importantly,  it would  allow  for a 
better  discussion  of  the  role  of  subsidies  and  tariffs in  the  transition, 
along  the lines  of Flemming  (1993). 
(4)  We  have  focused  on  the  role  of  workers  in  restructuring  and 
formalized  the restructuring decision  in a simple  way.  But the reality is 
more  complex,  with  games  between  workers,  and  between  manage- 
ment  and  workers,  and  where  the  outcome  depends  both  on  the 
institutional  environment  and  the  characteristics of firms. We explored 
some  of  these  issues  in  Aghion  et  al.  (1993)  in  a  partial  equilibrium 
model.  Bringing them in a general equilibrium framework, and thinking 
about the  role of the  government  in that context,  strikes us as promis- 
ing. 
(5) A related issue is the relation between  restructuring and privatiza- 
tion. As we  showed  in our description  of Poland earlier, our assumption 
that restructuring  and  privatization  happen  simultaneously  is not  cor- 
rect:  Privatization  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  restructuring,  and 
whether  it does  depends  in  part on  the  form of privatization.  A more 
explicit  treatment  of the  relation between  privatization  and  restructur- 
ing  may  help  assess  if,  e.g.,  increasing  the  speed  of  privatization  by 
making  it  easier  for insiders  to  acquire  their  firms is likely  to  help  or 
hinder  the  process  of transition. 
(6)  Finally,  we  have  treated  private  job  creation  as  a  black  box. 
Looking  within  the  black box,  and  in  particular looking  at the  role  of 
financial  intermediation,  and  within  that,  the  role  of  banking  reform, 
also strikes us as important. 
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PATRICK  J. KEHOE 
University  of Pennsylvania  and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis 
I enjoyed  reading  the paper. It is well  written  and well  worth  reading. 
It discusses  some interesting  data and raises some issues that economists 
working  on transition need  to struggle with.  Since Andy Atkeson  and I 
have  been  struggling  with  many  of  these  same  issues  but  don't  often 
cross  paths  with  Olivier,  I welcome  the  chance  to  discuss  these  with 
him. 
Aghion  and  Blanchard  present  evidence  from Poland  that  from the 
beginning  of  1990 through  the  end  of  1991, real  GDP  dropped  20%, 
industrial production  dropped  more than 30%, and unemployment  rose 
to about 12%. They build a simple qualitative model  that captures some 
of  these  features  of  the  aggregate  data  as well  as some  micro  details, 
including  ownership  structure within  firms and  policies  for unemploy- 
ment benefits. 
In this  comment  I do  four things.  First, I discuss  some  details  of the 
data. Second,  I discuss  four possible  explanations  of  the  data. Third, I 
focus  on  the  explanation  of Aghion  and  Blanchard by building  a little 
model  that  captures  most  of  the  insights  of  their  story.  Fourth,  I end 
with  some  questions  about the  specifics of their model. 
1.  Data Issues 
Consider  the macro data. When  I think about different potential  stories 
to tell about the reform, I find it crucial to have data on labor productiv- 
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